An appreciation in five acts.
John Kasson and the Making of U.S. Cultural History
Today, when we talk about historiography, we often speak in “turns.”[1] We invoke “generational” turns from “quantitative” to “qualitative” analysis during the 1960s. Or we point to a long list of superseding “turns” from the 1970s onward: the “new social history” giving way to the “new cultural history,” which is then said to have given way to the “new” histories of capitalism, globalization, environment, and more. Most recently, we have invoked “turns” to planetary history, infrastructural history, non-human actors, new materialisms, and digital history. All of this makes sense insofar as any active discipline requires new rubrics and rosters to capture its shifting contours. I, myself, have been centrally involved in tracking the field of history’s complex engagements with the “cultural turn” over the past quarter century.[2]
Still, I have sometimes worried that our broader “turn talk” has come at a larger cost. Too often, it seems to me, we have imagined history’s shifting contours operating according to a logic of built-in obsolescence—each new “turn” superseding the disciplinary projects which came before it—but with no clear indication of how our remaining subfields (social history, labor history, cultural history, intellectual history, economic history) have continued to stretch and grow. Much like the never-ending promotions for the latest iPhones, the gathering momentum of these debates has made it easy to consign multiple major groundswells to the historiographical dustbin.
The wide-angle scope of this turn talk, moreover, has often led us to neglect much of the localized innovation taking place within each new groundswell. At the end of the day, every “turn” is subjective and contingent: a historiographical process we experience through our own trajectories and standpoints. Just as our training grounds shape our early pathways, the journals we read, classes we teach, conferences we attend, and wider socio-economic and political worlds we inhabit ultimately define our perceptions of (and engagements with) the turns themselves.
In what follows here, then, I want to offer something different. Instead of producing another hot take on history’s shifting fault lines, what if we follow a single innovator moving through the cultural turn in U.S. history over the course of forty years? My touchstone for this exercise will be John F. Kasson: one of our subfield’s leading lights since the 1970s. Why pursue this line of questioning? For starters, Kasson’s multi-faceted corpus has not yet received the broader attention it so richly deserves. As we shall see, each of his five books helped to catalyze major developments often glossed over or taken for granted in the prior turn talk. These innovations included some of the first engagements by a U.S. historian (in any subfield) with the writings of Clifford Geertz, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Mikhail Bakhtin, Norbert Elias, Victor Turner, and Erving Goffman, as well as early efforts to showcase the explanatory power of discursive analysis, intersectional analysis, affect theory, and visual culture.
At the same time, I want to ponder more of Kasson’s ground-level choices. Working from book to book across multiple decades, one can see him making a series of localized decisions about what kind of cultural historian he wanted to be: in his early pivot from “synoptic” intellectual history to Geertzian “thick description”; or in his subsequent efforts to take popular culture seriously as a category of historical analysis; or in his later choices about how far to go vis-à-vis post-structuralist theory in his work on nineteenth-century manners. Important, too, was Kasson’s decision to build this larger corpus as a series of elegantly written trade books. At a moment when we humanists now often find ourselves marginalized (or wholly ignored) in public discourse, we would do well to revisit the work of a pioneering culturalist who succeeded in translating many of our field’s most complex problems for wider readerships.
Finally, a quick word of full disclosure. My own relationship with John Kasson extends over more than thirty years. I first met John at the American Studies Association conference in 1994; and to be honest, the whole thing was a pretty heady experience for me. At the time, I was barely past my graduate coursework; all of the other speakers on our panel were tenured scholars; and this was my very first attempt at presenting work at a national conference. What I remember most about that scene are two powerful images: first, my shaking hands, as I began to go public with some of the ideas that would eventually find their way into my first book, The Arts of Deception; and then the astonishing virtuosity of Kasson’s comment, among the very best I’ve ever witnessed—and delivered entirely without notes.[3]
This early experience set a very high bar for me: above all, the sophistication of John’s comment, but also the fact that it was directed at a fourth-year Ph.D. student he had never met before. Thirty-two years later, I know how rare that truly is. Ever since (and as “Professor Kasson” became simply “John” to me), I have benefited from his gentle brilliance on many different occasions. I have learned from his incisive feedback on most of my manuscripts. I have taught his books to thousands of students. And I have benefited from his advice and encouragement so many times that I long ago lost track of the specific contexts.
On one level, then, I hope this essay will repay a debt of gratitude. I also hope it may encourage new generations of culturalists to revisit the books in question. From his 1976 debut, Civilizing the Machine, to his most recent book from 2014, The Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression, the broader publics for Kasson’s work have cut across many different corners of U.S. history and American Studies, as well as the humanities at large. Simply put, John Kasson has long been one of our subfield’s most important innovators and teachers—a primary architect of the “cultural turn” itself. Returning to his enduring body of work shows us how much we still have to learn from one of the foundational voices in U.S. cultural history.
Act One—Civilizing the Machine (1976)
Let me begin with a telling detail: the very first citation in Civilizing the Machine.[4] Even those familiar with John’s 1976 debut may not have had much occasion to revisit its many footnotes. Depending on your generational cohort, the names here may be quite familiar. For most of us, it will come as little surprise to find the work of Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood cited in a book about “republican ideology.” Nor is it particularly surprising to find Robert Shallope’s 1972 state-of-the-field essay, “Toward a Republican Synthesis,” in the citational mix. Shallope’s review essay was still regarded as a standard teaching tool at the time I arrived for graduate school in the Fall of 1990.
The most telling detail in this opening footnote is the conceptual essay which precedes the historiography: Clifford Geertz’s “Ideology as a Cultural System.”[5] My point here is not simply that John was among the first disciplinary historians to cite Geertz’s work in any context.[6] More important, perhaps, was what John did with these important ideas emanating from “symbolic” and “cultural” anthropology. Following Geertz’s lead, Civilizing the Machine offered new ways of thinking about ideology that were (to use Geertz’s language) “non-evaluative” and never “flattened.” They treated ideology as something more than a mere “reflection” of something deeper. Nor did John treat this “ideology” as a form of “social control”—what Geertz referred to (in the process of differentiating his approach) as the “artfully contrived weapon of propaganda.”
In John’s hands, rather, “republican ideology” emerged as something fluid and complex. It formed a “basis” for collective “action.” It “shaped” popular modes of “understanding.” It provided a “configuration of assumptions, values, and beliefs” through which ordinary Americans “sought to interpret and transform their political and social relationships.” It resided not merely in the founding fathers’ political tracts, but in “every mode of expression available—in pamphlets, newspapers, broadsides, almanacs, sermons, speeches, letters, and diaries.”
Significantly, John’s conception of republican ideology reverberated through the era’s visual culture, as well—a domain of ideas and meaning-making rarely considered by U.S. historians at this juncture. Look, for instance, at chapter four, “The Aesthetic of Machinery,” in which he shifts our attention to the formal logics of “republican iconography.” No mere “illustrations” here! In John’s hands, rather, the entire argument unfolds from close readings of non-canonical engravings, paintings, and photographs. In 1976, there were not many U.S. historians (in any subfield) who would have dared to venture an argument on technology, politics, and ideology through an archive composed entirely of visual images.
Push a bit deeper into the notes, and one finds additional seedbeds for this highly omnivorous, wide-angle approach to ideology. Most significantly, perhaps, one finds citations from Henry Nash Smith, Leo Marx, John William Ward, and Alan Trachtenberg, all major figures within the American Studies movement from the 1950s through the 1970s.[7] As with Smith’s Virgin Land or Trachtenberg’s Brooklyn Bridge, Civilizing the Machine deployed an eclectic range of sources: high and low; artistic, scientific and political; textual and visual. John also followed these authors’ preference for the longue durée—the better to track important longitudinal shifts in ideas and imagery.
Like the “myth and symbolists,” too, John was never simply content with merely excavating “schools of thought” based on their canonical importance. Rather, Civilizing the Machine was a book about ideas in action: an expanding “range of human perceptions.” This term—perception—appears more than a dozen times in John’s debut. In chapter four, for example, John tells us that the “machine aesthetic… extended far beyond characteristics of design: it was a mode of perception.” And in this sense, John’s pivot from “schools of thought” to “ways of seeing” mirrored the “collective perceptions” from Virgin Land—those “products of the imagination” which, as Nash Smith had famously argued, “exert a decided influence on practical affairs.”[8]
In John’s hands, however, these shifting “products of the imagination” did not follow the older playbooks of the 1950s and 1960s. Most notably, John evinced little interest in the Myth and Symbolist search for a “national character” said to be traceable through words and images. Indeed, one of the striking features of John’s debut is the extent to which it was far more a portrait of perceptual conflict than national consensus: a story of competing and often dissonant visions of republican ideology amidst the whirlwind of modernization.[9] The “perceptions” were “collective,” but also “contested”: part of a volatile system of thought and discourse defined as much by its internal fault lines as its shared grammars of “republican virtue.”
What John was starting to build, in short, was a very different mode of “cultural” analysis than most U.S. historians had deployed before.[10] Like Geertz, John’s understanding of culture was never epiphenomenal: a mere “reflection” of something figured as “deeper” or more “foundational” to U.S. history (such as politics or economics). For the first time, really, culture itself was becoming dynamic and determinative—a causal motor rather than an expected outcome. And in John’s hands, this motor performed its work without the usual Cold War overtones of American “exceptionalism.”
Act Two—Amusing the Million (1978)
Not bad, then, for a young, untenured professor only five years out of graduate school. But what next? Where would John go with this intriguing toolbox, these novel modes of “cultural” questioning? The answer, it turned out, was to hop on a Brooklyn-bound F Train headed south for Coney Island. Today, it is easy to forget how bold a move this actually was in 1978. At the time that John published Amusing the Million, there just weren’t many books like this anywhere in the academic humanities: an archivally grounded, historical “reading” of a mass cultural “landscape.”[11] Serious histories of modern U.S. popular/mass culture still numbered in the single digits: from Warren Susman’s seminal essays on “personality” and David Grimsted’s Melodrama Unveiled to Robert Toll’s Blacking Up, Neil Harris’ Humbug, and Robert Sklar’s Movie-Made America.[12]
With typical modesty, John described Amusing the Million as a long-form “essay” built from “old photographs.” But once again, the footnotes tell a more complex story: one of a voracious reader and innovator weaving together Victor Turner’s “rites of passage” and Erving Goffman’s “frame analysis”; Mikhail Bakhtin’s seminal work on the “carnivalesque” and Robert Venturi’s postmodern architectural manifesto, Learning from Las Vegas.[13] It’s worth noting, too, that Amusing the Million was the very first academic history of that era to reference Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s 1940s writings on the “culture industries”: a theoretical lineage that would soon prove to be enormously formative for many of us working as U.S. cultural historians.[14]
What did John ultimately teach us about this industry? Among other things, he revealed that this crucial sector of global capitalism had been overlooked by historians. He also showed that the “ways of seeing” produced by the culture industries could be embedded in commercial landscapes—or in this case, the actual rides, rules, and designs of the parks themselves. Yet another lesson was that the “million” at the center of this story (the early consumers of U.S. mass culture) were quite a bit more than mere vessels for words and texts. These consumers’ physical bodies and corporeal experiences mattered for cultural historians, too.
John also helped us to see that “play” itself could be “serious.” In striking contrast to Adorno’s ahistorical polemics on Hollywood “formulas,” vertically integrated “sameness,” and corporate “manipulation,” John’s work showed us the enormous difference that Coney Island made in creating new urban publics, new spaces for experimentation, and above all, new modes of sociability for hundreds of thousands of turn-of-the-century immigrants to New York City. For these young urban workers previously confined to small European villages and ethnic enclaves, Coney Island was a revelation: a world apart from clergy, parents, and shop bosses; a place where one could flirt and carouse openly; a space where one could try on novel forms of “youth culture” or simply enjoy the rush of the swelling crowds.
And who else but John Kasson could help us to see that Luna Park’s “Tickler” (pictured in a virtuoso chapter on the rides themselves) was something more than spinning in circles. The ride itself served to break down older protocols around bodily decorum; and for a young consumer from the Lower East Side tenements, this brief journey through man-made darkness could feel like a kind of “freedom”—the dizzying rush of “modernity” itself. When I first encountered this work in grad school, I had never seen anything quite like it. In part, this was because so much of the pioneering historical scholarship on “popular culture” by figures like Natalie Zemon Davis, E.P. Thompson, Robert Darnton, Lawrence Levine, Peter Burke, and others had focused on pre-industrial rituals, traditions, and folkways.[15] What John provided, by contrast, was a kind of master class in reading mass cultural artifacts and commercial landscapes that seemed almost effortless, as if historians had always pulled significance out of mechanical thrill rides or sideshow ballyhoos.
In one of the large lecture courses I have taught at the University of Michigan since the early aughts (“New York Modern: The Cultures of the Great Metropolis”), I have borrowed shamelessly from these insights. How, I ask my students, might we understand the interconnected social worlds of these early twentieth-century urban consumers: by day, workers in the burgeoning needle trades; by night and on the weekends, voracious consumers of mass amusements? Relatedly, how might we read a Lower East Side novel like Anzia Yezierska’s semi-autobiographical Bread Givers against the grain of these photographs of young immigrant women mugging for the cameras—or losing their balance (and inhibitions) in the “Tunnel of Love”? For me, and many other U.S. cultural historians, it was John’s seminal work on mass entertainment which first made such questions possible.[16]
But John also helped me to see that Coney Island’s notion of “freedom” (both as discursive construct and marketing schtick) should not be taken at face value. In retrospect, one of the most powerful lessons of Amusing the Million is that Coney Island’s “rebellion” against Victorian priggishness was, in fact, built into the park’s marketing programs. Coney Island’s “anarchic freedoms,” that is to say, did not emerge from some working-class “underground” or stronghold of “popular rebellion.” Rather, this was how the rising culture industries began to position themselves vis-à-vis American “youth” in the early decades of corporate capitalism. Vernacular styles and working-class exuberance could be repurposed and skillfully packaged by savvy businessmen like Frederick Thompson, who, in turn, sanitized the rougher edges of the “popular” and turned them into reproducible “experiences” for fin-de-siècle U.S. consumers. Coney Island might have offered festivity, even bacchanalia, but it was a “managed celebration.”[17]
This “carnival spirit,” as John noted, was always contingent and multivalent, representing many different things to different types of consumers and historical actors: men, women, immigrants, journalists, reformers, and left-wing critics. Indeed, one’s own position within the larger drama mattered enormously. For a young woman growing up on the Lower East Side, it was no small thing to save one’s wages, board an excursion train to Brooklyn, and interact with thousands of like-minded consumers irrespective of nationality, gender, or religion. For new U.S. immigrants crowded into tenement buildings, especially, John noted, “the emergent mass culture offered an opportunity to participate in American life on a new basis, outside traditional forms and proscriptions.”
Yet for critics like Maxim Gorky, this was a “freedom” that soon rang hollow: a seeming sort of anarchy that quickly devolved into “glittering boredom.” Despite all the playfulness of John’s close readings, one eventually gets the sense that his own views tilted in this direction, too. Much like Stuart Hall, who was doing similarly deep and deconstructive work on the rubric of the “popular” in the later 1970s, John’s approach to “massification” was to take it seriously, but also critically: to treat the products of the rising culture industries not as an unbridled expression of a “people’s culture,” but as an ongoing series of appropriations and strategic positions, a contested sector of corporate capitalism whose broader meanings were never fixed or finished.[18]
Act Three—Rudeness and Civility (1990)
My next encounter with John’s work was the most important on a personal level. I remember the moment quite precisely. Having recently arrived in Berkeley for graduate school in 1990, I was searching for an original angle on an early research paper. Broadly speaking, I was intrigued by the origins of mass culture, especially P.T. Barnum’s “humbugs” of the middle decades of the nineteenth century. I was also trying to make sense of Barnum’s playful trickery in relation to the rise of market capitalism, but was not getting very far with the older scholarship. Most of it simply noted the antebellum public’s “fondness” for being “fooled.” At this point, my Berkeley seminar leader, Lawrence Levine, suggested I take a look at a recent book he had just blurbed: John Kasson’s Rudeness and Civility.[19]
For me, the key moment came in John’s opening lines of chapter three, “Reading the City: The Semiotics of Everyday Life.” This passage remains one of my favorites in the larger canons of U.S. cultural history and is worth quoting at some length:
Of all the voluminous texts produced in the nineteenth century, among the most massive and challenging were the new metropolises themselves. They were recognized by writers of all sorts as the great signifying structures of the age: vast, intricate repositories, dense with meaning, out of which more specific texts might be created. Observers typically stressed, however, the enormous difficulty of reading the city at large and its inhabitants, let alone writing about them…. The theme of the city’s illegibility was a recurrent one, common to writers as diverse as Balzac, Engels, and Poe. But to learn the language of the modern city and to read it as a text was no mere belletristic act; it was essential to a full and meaningful urban life. Without this ability one would remain perpetually an uncomprehending stranger, baffled by the city’s signs and codes, unable to understand others or represent oneself. The rise of the nineteenth century created enormous anxiety over precisely this crisis of meanings, what might be called a semiotic breakdown.[20]
This innovative set of moves hit me like a ton of bricks. Most immediately, it helped me to make some sense of Barnum’s audience: to see the rising “new middle class” as something more than pious souls who attended Protestant revivals in upstate New York, separated their lives into gendered spheres of sociability, child-rearing, and business, and invested most of their time and energy in various forms of moral self-regulation.
Self-control was, of course, a critical issue in Rudeness and Civility—from the etiquette manuals and advice books to the new rules around food, table manners, and emotion—but here, as in his other work, John was offering us a more intriguing and subtle portrait of a core historiographical rubric (in this case, “the new middle class” of the 1830s and 1840s) than we had encountered in previous scholarship. For the first time, really, the “new middle class” began to appear not merely as anxious agents of “moral reform,” but as active improvisers in the swirl and flux of modernization.[21] In John’s hands, the quest for “legible character” was less a repressive effect of the Second Great Awakening than a functional response to ambiguous market relations and an opaque world of urban strangers.[22]
Over time, moreover, this book helped me to think through some of the most heated conceptual debates within the “new cultural history.” The early 1990s marked a kind of turning point for cultural history as a whole: a moment when our previously renegade subfield moved towards the center of the larger discipline, attracted small armies of would-be practitioners, and seemed to offer the cutting edges of historiographical practice.[23] Case in point was Joan Scott’s “Evidence of Experience” (1991), a brilliant and oft-reprinted essay now typically described as a seismic shift in the theory and practice of historical scholarship. It was here that Scott began to argue against the very possibility of pre-discursive forms of “experience.”
Following the insights of Foucault and Derrida, Scott’s larger point was to initiate a kind of “Copernican revolution” in our understandings of historical causality. For most social, economic, and labor historians prior to the 1990s, “experience” was something grounded in “material conditions” —a socio-economic “base” out of which new “discursive formations” and “ways of seeing” might emerge. For Scott, by contrast, it was precisely the discourses and perceptions themselves—those prisms of “meaning-making” already there in our heads and baked into ways of seeing—that formed the necessary starting points of historical inquiry. As Scott herself famously put it: “it is not individuals who have experiences, but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience in this definition… becomes not the origins of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain.”[24]
For much of the next decade (and ever since, really), the standard response to Scott’s ideas was to plant a flag and take a side in the field of history’s “internecine agonies”: “cultural history” vs. “social history”; “discursive formations” vs. “material conditions;” micro-level “perceptions” vs. macro-level “structures.”[25] Less often noted are the U.S. cultural historians who rejected these rigid zero sums and plotted their own pathways across the emerging conceptual fault lines. As evidence, look at what John was actually doing in the passage above. On one level, Rudeness and Civility was sharply attuned to the insights of post-structuralism. Again and again, John presents his new middle-class urbanites as fully embedded in a dizzying world of signs, symbols, tropes, and discourses. Like Scott, he suggests there was no simple “outside” of the discursive field, no socio-historical perspective wholly detached from the “semiotic breakdown.” The broader social world at stake here (the “new metropolis”) has itself become largely opaque, a semi-illegible “text.” For those seeking to make sense of its ambiguous signs and surfaces, there was no mode of urban perception unmediated by prior words, images, and categories. In the passage above, for example, we find a cascading chain of “texts”: the ambiguous surfaces of the city itself shaping the production of published city guides—which, in turn, shape novel ways of “reading the city” for anxious urbanites.
But was this, in fact, a decisive pivot away from the “social”? Was it a reading of new middle-class “discourses” wholly unmoored from their “material conditions”? Or to put it another way: was John suggesting the erasure of a knowing “subject” in the post-structuralist sense of that term—a historical actor no longer fully conscious of, or able to manipulate, the prevailing terms of public discourse? No: and the key tell here was John’s frequent use of the terms “recognize,” “create,” and “learn.” John’s antebellum “observer” was sometimes confounded by the new metropolis’ growing opacity and dizzying array of signs, but also intensely self-conscious of the prevailing tropes of semiotic peril.[26]
Many of his central characters were active producers of those tropes. In the same chapter, John introduces us to George “Gaslight” Foster: antebellum man on the make, best-selling author of city guides, and savvy entrepreneur who embraced this “semiotic breakdown” as a business opportunity. Much like Eugene Sandow, Harry Houdini, and Edgar Rice Burroughs (the subjects of John’s next book), Foster was a master of refraction: a careful observer of public discourses who strategically positioned himself as a kind of antidote to the prevailing forms of urban anxiety. Far from standing outside the public worries, Foster transformed them into new genres of urban writing and sold them back to his middle-class readerships as an antebellum form of expertise. In this sense, Foster suggested possibilities very different from those imagined by Foucault: a metropolitan brand of knowingness, a semiotic savior-faire.
Act Four—Houdini, Tarzan and the Perfect Man (2001)
John’s next book was a bit of a swerve.[27] Most notably, it was his first focused study of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity as explicit categories of analysis (although his interest in categories of identity and their socio-cultural power had been building for many years).[28] At the 1994 ASA conference where I first met him, for example, his virtuoso comment took on the cross-dressing female impersonator, Julian Elting.[29] Seven years later, John dedicated Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man to two close friends and trusted interlocutors with deep expertise in these fields: his longtime UNC colleague, Peter Filene, a pioneering U.S. historian of gender and sex; and John’s beloved partner, Joy Kasson, a distinguished American Studies scholar herself who had written on questions of femininity, masculinity, and representation over many years.[30]
John built Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man as an interlocking series of portraits designed to explicate the many dimensions of white Progressive-era manhood: the celebrity body builder, Eugene Sandow; the magician Erich Weiss (aka Harry Houdini); Edgar Rice Burroughs and his fictional stories of Tarzan. Previous studies in this area had typically limited their historiographical purview to Teddy Roosevelt’s “strenuous life”: a fin de siècle blueprint built through toil, danger, struggle, and above all, public acts of physical prowess. John began with TR, too, but quickly zoomed outward. Why, he wondered, had photo albums in his own Muncie, Indiana family included 1904 portraits of a great-grandfather stripped to the waist and flexing his muscles? What connected this half-naked ancestor to the Harvard rowing feats, big game hunting, and gunboat diplomacy of TR?
In retrospect, part of the wonder of Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man is its remarkable breadth and erudition across many different genres. Indeed, as one cycles through the book’s astonishing range of sources, contexts, and characters, it’s easy to imagine John “flexing” his own broad command of the era’s print cultures: dime novels, westerns, and science fiction; business magazines, physical education manuals, and stage magician memoirs; writings on Western expansion, U.S. imperialism, factory efficiency, corporate organization, and modern policing. In so doing, John was also stretching the scope of U.S. cultural history as a whole. Look, for instance, at his chapter on Harry Houdini, a story which begins in 1890s dime museums and vaudeville houses but expands to close readings of the magician’s dazzling escapes from police stations, prisons, hospitals, docks, factories, and other public sites beyond the theater. In one famous example, Houdini escaped from a straightjacket hanging upside down from a crane in New York’s Times Square. In another, he emerged from a packing crate thrown into the East River next to Governor’s Island.
By following the magician’s trajectory, John was doing more than simply breaking down the “fourth wall” of performance. He was also collapsing a series of conceptual boundaries which had previously divided our larger subfield into a series of siloed buckets. These included older fault lines such as “culture” and “society,” “intellect” and “amusement,” and “high” and “low,” but also internal boundaries separating “culture” understood as “art” or “aesthetics” (aka the Matthew Arnold definition); culture understood as “consumption” (aka the Thorstein Veblen or Frankfurt School definitions); and “culture” understood in the broader “anthropological” senses of values, norms, traditions, and social fabrics (aka the Franz Boas definition). For one leading critic, the work of differentiating these “concepts of culture” led to a kind of ranking system: each one assigned to its putative levels of “significance” and ambition.[31] John, by contrast, pursued the more inclusive approach of following the “cultural” wherever the evidence led—and then demonstrating with equal rigor how and why each image, text, ritual, product, and practice mattered in its local context.
Telling here, as well, was John’s use of the term “spectacle” to capture the ever-widening sphere of “meaning making” accelerated by the rise of the modern culture industries. Whereas previous scholars had previously resitrcted their frames of analysis to a single medium, genre, or venue, John joined a wave of new studies—Robert Allen’s Horrible Prettiness (1991), Miriam Hansen’s Babel and Babylon (1991), George Lipsitz’s Dangerous Crossroads (1994), Robin Kelley’s Race Rebels (1996), Susan Glenn’s Female Spectacle (2000), my own Arts of Deception (2001)—which sought to expand the parameters of cultural history to include consumption as well as production; live performances as well as disembodied texts; mass marketing as well as public reception; media events and public scandals as well as brick and mortar venues. Were Houdini’s escapes a novel form of performance art? A new kind of mass cultural product? A clever publicity stunt? A catalyst for sparking public debates on industrial discipline, urban surveillance, and mass incarceration?
For John, the answer to all these questions was a resounding “yes.” And in working through so many different contexts and registers, John was simultaneously building an affirmative argument for the breadth and efficacy of cultural history. Along the way, he was also beginning to address the related question of amplification: the process by which certain Progressive-era figures, discourses, and representations became more visible and/or ubiquitous than others. Notably, John concluded his Introduction to this book with a powerful summary of the “structural changes” taking place in the culture industries’ distribution systems: all of which, he argued, were experiencing macro-level processes of “systematization, centralization, and managerial control.” This focused attention on the “industrialization” of mass culture was still relatively rare. But John pursued these moves with rich data, careful contextualization, and telling examples (the rise of the United Booking Office, or the media empire built by William Randolph Hearst), each one designed to explicate the widening mediascapes of the first “mass publics” of the twentieth century.[32]
The final wrinkle here was John’s multi-layered approach to gender, race, and sex. Over the previous decade, much of the innovative work in U.S. cultural history had pursued two interrelated moves: first “deconstructing” seemingly transparent categories of analysis (race, gender, sex, class); then placing these multiple standpoints and categories of “subjectivity into a mutually constitutive mix.”[33] Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man was not simply a downstream effect of these conceptual moves. It was also one of our first and most deeply contextualized “intersectional” histories of white U.S. masculinity from that moment. As usual, John favored elegant writing and compelling storytelling over conceptual posturing. He did not use terms like “intersectional,” “metadiscursive, or “mutually constitutive” at any point. Scratch beneath the surface, however, and the book’s ambitions seem very clear. Here, after all, was a multi-layered history of the “unclad white male body” told not only in the registers of gender and sex, but also in relation to race, religion, ethnicity, immigration, corporate capitalism, factory labor, mass marketing, and U.S. empire.[34]
One can see these ambitions at work in the book’s clever architecture. John begins with Eugene Sandow, German fitness prodigy turned bodybuilder, and his new “standard” for white masculinity: ghostly pale and scantily clad; erotically charged and finely chiseled; carved from “Grecian” ideals as much as scientific metrics of physical “perfection.” Then he shifts to Houdini, whose sadomasochistic “torture tests” appealed to non-elite factory and office workers—Progressive-era consumers who, much like Houdini’s shackled persona, found themselves increasingly subject to new forms of industrial discipline, corporate strictures, and urban policing. He concludes with Edgar Rice Burroughs, who despite his bourgeois upbringing in Chicago endured a series of recurring setbacks: failed student and soldier, unsuccessful patent medicine salesman, store owner, cattle rancher, office manager for Sears Roebuck, and applicant to Roosevelt’s Rough Riders.
Still, Burroughs eventually found his calling by championing the undiminished power of white Anglo-Saxon manhood in the context of “pulp fiction.” The unlikely vehicle for this breakthrough was a series of best-selling dime novels about a blue-blooded English boy raised by giant apes in the context of British colonialism. Today, of course, the entire set-up seems preposterous. After violently “murdering” Tarzan’s father, Lord Greystroke, the apes nevertheless raise the English infant as one of their own. And despite his parents’ inability to survive in the “wild,” Tarzan ultimately becomes a kind of ultimate fighting machine: still legibly white and Anglo-Saxon but now freed in the African jungle from the emasculating forces of Western “civilization.”
As John sardonically notes, besides swinging from fictional trees, Tarzan’s primary function in these books was to speak disparagingly about African people, vanquish all non-British opposition, and unleash a bold new model of white virility and violence. Soon, however, Tazan’s mass popularity became a kind of “prison” for Burroughs himself. As early as 1919 (only six books into the cycle of twenty-four), Burroughs expressed growing frustration with the burden of finding anything new to say about his “king of the jungle.” John hints at his own feelings about Burroughs’ predicament in the chapter’s final sentence: “though he commanded his literary empire with stern authority and claimed a ‘big’ man’s income, he never escaped the self-doubt and tedium of the walled-in clerk.”
Act Five—The Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression (2014)
This brings me, finally, to John’s 2014 book on the Depression era film star, Shirley Temple. Over time, I’ve come to think of The Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression as a historiographical magic trick. First, we encounter the “pledge,” that moment when the stage magician shows us something seemingly mundane to capture our attention: in this case, Temple’s beaming smile. Then John pivots to the “turn”: the moment when this seemingly mundane object begins to do “extraordinary” things. To initiate this process, John offers us a series of startling facts: that Temple made twenty-two films in the course of a single decade; that she was the biggest U.S. box office star of the mid-1930s (second only to FDR in her national resonance); that she, quite literally, “saved Hollywood” from financial collapse; and that much of her work involved not only portraits of emotional resiliency, but also issues of child abandonment, hunger, poverty, unemployment, and broken families.
In the final twist—or “prestige”—John plays with our assumptions yet again, explaining that his seemingly modest “cultural biography” is actually a much wider-angle history of child labor practices, the social and psychic effects of financial crisis, New Deal policymaking, novel strategies of mass communication, and above all, the growing importance of emotion and affect in modern U.S. politics. At the center of the book are two intriguing propositions: first, that Temple’s seemingly “vacuous” social commentary was, in fact, a powerful historical motor in shaping public opinion; and second, that Temple’s legendary “sparkle” mattered deeply for the ways in which ordinary Americans made sense of the largest “peacetime crisis” in all of U.S. history.
In a moment, I’ll say a bit more about how John delivered on these promises. First, though, allow me a short digression to explain more of the historiographical context. The initial outlines of this book first appeared in 2005, part of a stunning paper John delivered with a group of his UNC PhD students at a national conference I helped to organize in Washington, D.C.: The State of Cultural History. Over the previous year, Michael O’Malley, Roy Rosenzweig, Lawrence Glickman, and I had conceived this event to honor another pioneering figure in U.S. cultural history: Lawrence W. Levine.[35]
But we also wanted this celebration to be something more than a standard festschrift. As Roy explained in a published conference report for the Journal of American History, “we felt there could be no greater tribute to Larry’s central role in creating cultural history as a field of study and a mode of analysis than to provide an opportunity for leading cultural historians to come together to present original and provocative work and to consider current problems and prospects in the field.”[36]
To this end, we built our larger program around a series of open questions. What had the “new cultural history” become by the early aughts? What were its accomplishments, blind spots, and prospects? Were we now moving “beyond” the cultural turn—as some prominent critics from this moment were suggesting? Or was this notion of superseding “turns” a kind of smokescreen, obscuring the pathbreaking work of younger scholars who continued to shape our field according to their own methods and priorities? To help us sort things out, we invited a multi-generational group of culturalists for a weekend of self-assessment: Jean Christophe Agnew, Eric Avila, Phil Deloria, Michael Denning, Nan Enstad, Ann Fabian, Elliot Gorn, Karen Halttunen, Waldo Martin, Elaine Tyler May, Nell Painter, Mary Odem, Shane White, and John Kasson.
This conference remains “good to think with” on several levels. For starters, this was the first national gathering of U.S. cultural historians outside of an annual meeting of the history profession at large. It was also our first collaborative effort to sort and sift “the turn” itself, track its methodological contours, and formulate a series of possible road maps for future work in cultural history. Three years later, Larry, Mike, and I published The Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past, Present, and Future, a volume based on the conference which featured revised and expanded “agenda” essays from Jean Agnew, Phil Deloria, Nan Enstad, and myself, as well as several early excerpts of important books-in-progress. These included not only John’s Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression (2014), but also Ann Fabian’s The Skull Collectors (2010); Shane White’s Playing the Numbers (2010); Eric Avila’s The Folklore of the Freeway (2014); Elaine Tyler May’s Fortress America (2017); and Nan Enstad’s Cigarettes, Incorporated (2018).[37]
On one level, then, we might describe this moment as a kind of apex in “the turn”: a moment when U.S. cultural historians consolidated our strength in numbers, took stock of our prior achievements, and plotted our next moves. But this was also a period in which growing numbers of well-known critics took aim at cultural history. A few years earlier (1999), Lynn Hunt, former champion of the “new cultural history,” had pronounced the field exhausted—hence the need, as she put it, to look “beyond the cultural turn.”[38] From there, the floodgates began to open, as prominent commentators in multiple national subfields pointed to multiple conceptual blind spots and putative forms of “weakness” in the development of cultural history. For the British historian Peter Mandler, for example, the “problem with cultural history” was its imprecision around circulation and causality. In this view, cultural historians were good at assembling “discursive formations,” but far less effective in tracking their “throw”; accounting for their shifting conduits; or explaining the broader policies and infrastructures driving their modes of production. The net result, in Mandler’s view, was a field prone to sweeping claims of ideological impact, but often without much sense of how or where the “discourses” traveled.[39]
The French historian (and self-described creator of the “cultural turn”), William Sewell, took a somewhat different tack, arguing that the new cultural history of the 1980s had somehow “radicalized” during the 1990s, leaving us “ill-equipped” to wrestle with macro-level changes in the “global economy” and urgent questions of “structural inequality.” In this view, landmark works such as John Scott’s Gender and the Politics of History (1988), David Roediger’s Wages of Whiteness (1991), George Chauncey’s Gay New York (1994), and Gail Bederman’s Manliness and Civilization (1995) were symptomatic of a larger pivot to a “purely” cultural history immersed in “postmodern” theory and increasingly focused on words, images, categories, and identities (largely for their own sakes). Listen, for example, to a key passage from Sewell’s important collection of essays, Logics of History, in which he described this newly “radicalized” strain of culturalism unwittingly diverting us from the grand challenges of the twenty-first century:
In spite of my own trajectory (or perhaps because of it), I worry that the emergence of the current form of purely cultural history is extremely inopportune, coming as it does in a period of fundamental transformation of capitalism on a world scale—of decreasing ability of states to control their own destinies, of growing income disparities in the United States and in many other areas of the world, of ubiquitous declines in state welfare provision, and of sharp demobilizations of labor and the left—all pushed forward powerfully by the ascendant discourses of economic neo-liberalism. Somehow, at the very time when particularly powerful changes in social and economic structures are manifested ever more insistently in our daily lives, we cultural historians have ceased not only to grapple with such structures but even to admit their ontological reality.[40]
Still others, like the U.S. historian of capitalism, Sven Beckert, presented the cultural turn as a kind of epistemic barrier to clear-eyed thinking about economics. In a 2011 essay for American History Now, Beckert began by citing cultural history’s “sharp” and “foundational” critiques as the primary factors behind economic history’s waning “popularity.” Next, he took aim at the category of “identity” itself, arguing that previous cultural historians and Ethnic Studies scholars had done important work in adding “new contexts” and social standpoints, but largely at the cost of critical engagement with the “global economy.” Formulated in the wake of the Great Recession, Beckert now began to describe U.S. cultural history in the past tense and presented the cultural turn’s development as an episode from his graduate school years (one he had passed through briefly en route to building the “new history of capitalism”). Like much of the surrounding “turn talk” from this moment, Beckert found it easy to dispense with 30-plus years of cultural history in the course of a single paragraph:
By the 1980s and 1990s, labor history wandered even further afield, to investigate other, perhaps even competing “identities,” analyzing how class was reflected and often deflected by gender, ethnic, and race identities…. Their work for the first time brought women, African Americans, and others… into the story of American labor, a seminal and vital contribution. Unfortunately, these rich new perspectives were often wedded to the rather weak conceptual tool of identity, whose connection to structural elements of these workers’ historical context, the state, and the global economy was hard to map. It was perhaps not surprising that by the 2000s, graduate students and their mentors had lost enthusiasm for the history of workers.[41]
My point here is not to rekindle old debates. For my own part, I developed my own detailed rejoinders to these sorts of critiques for the American Historical Review in 2010.[42] And since the early aughts, I’ve regularly assigned these essays to my PhD students at the University of Michigan: part of my own localized efforts to bolster and strengthen our subfield’s foundations (or if you like, keep it “turning” in new and productive directions). As the old saying goes, what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.
Plotting Cultural History’s Futures While Learning From Our Elders
But where does this leave us now: many years “beyond” this swelling chorus of “turn talk”? Here, I would offer three final reflections.
First, while it’s probably fair to say that the “new cultural history” came with its share of blind spots, so, too, did these sweeping critiques of the cultural turn from the early aughts. Dig into the critics’ footnotes, and one discovers a striking pattern: namely, the absence of any cultural history work beyond 1995. In practice, this meant that a somewhat dated caricature of cultural history (somehow frozen in the Clinton years) came to stand in for our large and evolving field. In retrospect, this surprising lack of attention to cultural history’s presents and possible futures feels like a missed opportunity. Simply put, it was difficult to generate a robust debate on the “state” of cultural history when most of the leading critics from that moment were trading in older straw men.
My second point is simple: things change. Historiographical fashions come and go. And as new waves of culturalists have entered the lists, so too has U.S. cultural history reinvented itself once again. Consider the State of Cultural History one last time. Based on the critiques above, one might have expected to find essays from this moment that were: (a) narrowly noodling with words and categories; (b) inattentive to questions of infrastructure and resonance; (c) preoccupied with issues of identity; (d) uninterested in capitalism, labor, and state formation; and (e) mostly vague on questions of causality. The truth, however, is that virtually all of us who participated in the State of Cultural History were actively wrestling with just these questions—not because Hunt, Sewell, and others told us to do so, but because we (like most practitioners in any active field of scholarly inquiry) were seeking out new approaches as the world around us continued to change.
Certainly, it is hard to argue that Nan Enstad’s 2008 essay on the American Tobacco Company’s massive operations in China was somehow oblivious to “structural changes in global capitalism”—or, for that matter, problems of “inequality” across the global tobacco belts. Or that Phil Deloria’s complex interweaving of the cultural, political, policy, legal, and environmental “strands” of Native American studies amounted to a conceptually “weak” articulation of identity politics. Or that Eric Avila’s subtle efforts to bridge aesthetics, segregation patterns, built environments, and immigrant neighborhoods vis-à-vis the L.A. freeway system constituted a simple redux of an “older” cultural history.
Much the same was true of my own “agenda” essay: “The Return of the Culture Industry.” As I tried to make very clear, the larger goal of this piece was not to rehash older debates around consumer “agency” vs. corporate “control,” but rather to push my fellow historians of mass culture in new and unexplored directions.[43] Among other things, I wanted to treat the problem of “massification” as a historically contingent, structural process embedded in shifting industries. I wanted to connect the production of the “popular” to specific tools, platforms, and technologies: the first show business trade journals of the 1840s, for example; or the emergence of digital sampling in 1970s hip hop. More broadly, I wanted to engage the rising culture industries not as abstract engines of “false consciousness” (à la Adorno), but as an underexplored sector of global capitalism with its own economic, infrastructural, and labor histories (just like cotton, shoes, or cars). Above all, I wanted to better understand the powerful delivery systems through which ever larger numbers of texts, images, and products have come to seem ubiquitous and inescapable—and thereby exert their ideological and political force.
By the time these essays were published, I and others were just beginning to develop the requisite tools to describe this cluster of issues in relation to corporate power, shifting mediascapes, and novel forms of connectivity. But now look where we are today! A moment when the tools and methods of cultural history have migrated not only across the humanities, but also into digital studies, science and technology studies, environmental studies, the history of science, and even a few self-critical business schools. A context in which older expressions of the cultural turn have cross-pollinated not merely with the subsequent turns to capitalism, transnationalism, and infrastructure, but also with adjacent groundswells of work on media platforms, new materialisms, thing theory, and non-human actors.[44] To a surprising extent, we now find ourselves at a pivotal moment when the shifting tools of cultural history arguably matter more than ever—indeed, when leading national commentators such as Tim Wu, Chris Hayes, Kyla Scanlon, and Ezra Klein have routinely pointed to the twenty-first century “attention economies” as central contexts for our national politics, siloed mediascapes, and sense of “truth” itself.[45]
My final point is a word of caution about relegating our subfield’s elders to some kind of historiographical snapshot in the past. Based on the critiques I just rehearsed, one might have imagined the Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression serving as an easy target for critics like Hunt, Sewell, or Beckert. Among other possible sins, one might have imagined John being taken to task for devoting close attention to Temple’s “sparkle” at a moment of cascading national crises: the Iraq War (2003); Hurricane Katrina (2005); the “Great Recession” (2008-2010) and its aftermath. In such a context, one might have imagined John’s efforts to explicate the mass production of “happiness” being caricatured as a cultural studies-lite, i.e., too focused on Temple’s saccharine repertoire; too vague on Temple’s resonance; her many films and records a seeming diversion from the more serious stuff of economics, labor, poverty, and structural inequality.
But look at what John was actually pursuing in his final book. Start with Temple herself: a child actress who danced, sang, cracked jokes, and yes, regularly beamed for the cameras, yet in so doing, also deviated sharply from our conventional personae of “American workers” in the 1930s. Here, too, John was playing with our expectations, stretching our conventional sense of what a New Deal labor history might look like on the ground.[46] In so doing, John was helping us to see that the Hollywood Studio system represented a vertically integrated sector of corporate capitalism; that the commodity chains stretching from Temple’s early auditions to film production, recording sessions, fan magazines, and concert tours followed a Fordist mode of production not unlike the auto plants in Detroit (i.e., raw materials in one end, nationally-distributed products out the other); and above all, that the very notion of a pre-adolescent child smiling, dancing, and singing her way through twenty-two films in the course of a decade was itself a grueling form of physical and emotional labor.
This reframing of Temple’s “work,” however, was merely one step in a series of clever moves designed to help us think our way across the era’s historiographical fault lines. Much of John’s first chapter, for example, unfolds as a dense array of unemployment statistics, policy details, opinion polls, and political responses to economic catastrophe. From there, John turns to the problem of mass communications—and more specifically, to various federal efforts (some successful, others not) to convey some meaningful sense of hope and confidence. Here, John tracks the competing media strategies not only of Hoover and FDR, but also between the era’s most widely resonant politician (Roosevelt) and the era’s biggest star (Temple). In so doing, John helps us to see their common focus on new attentional tools (radio, film, press conferences, photo ops) designed to generate emotional connections with distant audiences, foster public resiliency, and circulate cultural images of personal strength.
The most intriguing feature of this book, however, was its agile treatment of “affect” in multiple sectors of public life.[47] Drawing upon the massive archives of personal letters sent to the White House and Temple’s fan clubs, John demonstrated with remarkable precision how this messaging ultimately landed. Rather than vaguely asserting the “dominance” of this or that view of the economy, John carefully tracked the words, ideas, imagery, and concepts from their points of production (speeches, films, radio broadcasts, song lyrics) outward to their localized resonances among ordinary Americans. Most striking of all, John suggested that the buzzwords of “optimism,” “happiness,” and “resiliency” began to serve as a new form of “emotional currency” (which, in turn, shaped the decade’s broader policy objectives). Listen, for example, to a key passage in Chapter 1, as John builds his connective threads:
The Great Depression was not simply a crisis of confidence, as at times Hoover seemed to believe, but one of fundamental national policies and economic structures. Yet from the outset, numerous figures including Republicans, Democrats, business leaders, and entertainers agreed that the Great Depression was also an emotional crisis and that it needed to be addressed on emotional terms. Market economies are social institutions, after all, not simply constellations of natural forces. They depend on moral and social values, including confidence, trust, and expectations of stability. All of these had taken a severe beating in the years since the stock market crash…. To reinvigorate these values was thus not a distraction or escape. Because such values could enliven a paralyzed economy, to summon them forth was a potent political act.[48]
In 1961, the renegade sociologist C. Wright Mills had ventured a similar set of connections in his now canonical essay on the “cultural apparatus,” arguing that historians needed to pay much closer attention to the interlocking mediascapes, government policies, entertainment industries, and corporate business models that structure our “second-hand” worlds of experience. What John powerfully added to this mix was a more carefully contextualized understanding of where and when the “apparatus” first took shape; the exceptional socio-economic forces which catalyzed its expansion; and above all, how it began to drive public opinion at a moment of national crisis. Twelve years later, it seems to me, we could use quite a bit more of this sort of historically grounded scholarship on political affect, emotion, and fear. The “apparatus” first imagined by Mills, after all, has been rapidly expanding into our smartphones, streaming devices, chatbots, data centers, and social media. But this time around, the billionaire politicians, CEO’s, and media influencers at the center of our “attention” are no longer smiling.
Want to respond? Write us.
About the Author
James Cook has written widely on the evolution of popular/mass culture, the rise of the global culture industries, African American art and ideas, the cultural turn in U.S. historiography, and most recently, the history of global celebrity. Over the past twenty-five years, he has taught scores of talented cultural historians at the University of Michigan. His publications include The Arts of Deception, The Colossal P.T. Barnum Reader, and The Cultural Turn in U.S. History, as well as numerous articles in American Quarterly, the Journal of American History, the American Historical Review, Raritan, and elsewhere. At present, he is working on the future directions of cultural history; the complex origins of the attention economies; and the rise of Black celebrity in global markets.
Notes
[1] This essay is a revised and significantly expanded version of a keynote lecture I delivered at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in October 2015. The occasion was Cultural History and its Publics, a two-day symposium in honor of John F. Kasson. I remain grateful to Fitz Brundage for inviting me to deliver this keynote, as well as the many UNC faculty, alumni, and students who attended the symposium and shared their stories. I also want to thank John’s brilliant partner, Joy Kasson, for her long-standing friendship and support since the early 1990s. Finally, my thanks to Sandy Zipp, who generously provided editing suggestions, as well as Michael J. Kramer, who kindly invited me to revise the original talk for publication in The Carryall and supported the larger revision process at every stage.
[2] James W. Cook, “Mass Marketing and Cultural History: The Case of P.T. Barnum,” American Quarterly, 51, 1 (1999), 175-186; James W. Cook, “Seeing the Visual in U.S. History,” Journal of American History, 95, 2 (September 2008), 432-441; James W. Cook, “Antebellum Cultural History,” Karen Halttunen, ed., The Blackwell Companion to American Cultural History (Blackwell, 2008), 65-78; James W. Cook and Lawrence Glickman, “Twelve Propositions for a History of U.S. Cultural History,” in James Cook, Lawrence Glickman, & Michael O’Malley, eds., The Cultural Turn in U.S. History (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 3-57; James W. Cook, “The Kids Are All Right: On the ‘Turning’ of Cultural History,” American Historical Review, 117.3 (June 2012), 746-771; “Interchange: Globalization and its Limits between the American Revolution and the Civil War,” Journal of American History, 103.2 (Sept 2016), 400-433.
[3] James W. Cook, The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum (Harvard University Press, 2001).
[4] John Kasson, Civilizing the Machine (Penguin Books, 1976).
[5] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973). The rest of John’s opening footnote included Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (University of North Carolina Press, 1969); and Robert Shallope, “Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 29 (January 1972): 49-80. Geertz’s essay was first published in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (The Free Press, 1964), 47-76. Notably, Bailyn, Wood, and Shallope were all part of the assigned reading list for my first graduate course at UC Berkeley in the Fall of 1990. But even then, Geertz’s work was still not part of the basic training regimen for U.S. historians at Berkeley.
[6] Many other important works in U.S. cultural history would soon register their debts to Geertz, as well. See, for example, Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia (Oxford University Press, 1982); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct (Oxford University Press, 1985); Susan Davis, Parades and Power (Temple University Press, 1986).
[7] For examples, see Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land (Harvard University Press, 1950); John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (Oxford University Press, 1955); R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam (University of Chicago Press, 1959); Charles L. Sanford, The Quest for Paradise (University of Illinois Press, 1961); William R. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee (W.H. Allen, 1963); Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden (Oxford University Press, 1964); Alan Trachtenberg, Brooklyn Bridge (University of Chicago Press, 1965); and Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black (University of North Carolina Press, 1968). See also Trachtenberg, “Myth and Symbol,” The Massachusetts Review 25 (Winter 1984), 667.
[8] Nash Smith, Virgin Land, xi. Subsequent critiques and revisions of Smith’s 1950 methodological statements were often launched by those from within the early American Studies movement. See, for example, Smith’s essay, “Can American Studies Develop a Method?,” American Quarterly 9 (Summer 1957), and his 1969 “Preface” to the twentieth anniversary printing of Virgin Land, vii-x; Leo Marx, “American Studies: A Defense of an Unscientific Method,” New Literary History 1 (October 1969); and Trachtenberg, “Myth and Symbol.”
[9] On this score, Civilizing the Machine was also part of a broader pivot within U.S. intellectual history. In 1980, for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted a general “flight” within the field from synthesizing concepts such as “the national character” and “liberal tradition,” as well as a growing consensus that anthropological conceptions of culture might serve as intellectual history’s “salvation.” “Review Essay/Intellectual History: A Time for Despair?” Journal of American History 66 (March 1980), 888-893.
[10] My use of the phrase “culture concept” comes from William Sewell’s important essay, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” first published in Lynn Hunt and Victoria Bonnell, eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn (University of California Press, 1999), 152-174.
[11] John Kasson, Amusing the Million (Hill & Wang, 1978). See also John’s later contribution to the exhibition catalog, Coney Island: Visions of an American Dreamland, 1861-2008 (Yale University Press, 2015).
[12] David Grimsted, Melodrama Unveiled (University of Chicago Press, 1968); Warren Susman, Culture as History (Pantheon, 1973); Neil Harris, Humbug (University of Chicago Press, 1973); Robert Toll, Blacking Up (Oxford University Press, 1974); Robert Sklar, Movie-Made America (Random House, 1976). This was also the moment when the earliest studies of media and massification were beginning to emerge from the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England. See, for example, Stuart Hall & Tony Jefferson, Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain (Hutchinson & Co. in Association with the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies, 1976); Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, & Paul Willis, Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-1979 (Hutchinson & Co. in Association with the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies, 1980). The decade following Amusing the Million witnessed the rapid expansion of the larger field, with important studies of world’s fairs, dance halls, vaudeville, early film and consumer culture by Robert Rydell, Alan Trachtenberg, Kathy Peiss, Robert Snyder, Jackson Lears, Richard Fox, and many others.
[13] Victor Turner, The Ritual Process (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Harper Colophon Books, 1974); Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World (MIT Press, 1968); Robert Venturi et. al,, Learning from Las Vegas (MIT Press, 1972).
[14] For the origins of the “culture industry” concept, see Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Herder & Herder, 1947). For broader discussion of subsequent historical work on the U.S. culture industries between the 1940s and 2000s, see James W. Cook, “The Return of the Culture Industry,” Cultural Turn in U.S. History, 292-316.
[15] For seminal histories of the “popular” in various pre-industrial contexts, see, for example, Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford University Press, 1975); E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present 50., 1 (February 1971): 76-136; Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Harvard University Press, 1969); Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 1977); Peter Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe (Harper Torch Books, 1978).
[16] Anzia Yezierska, Bread Givers (Doubleday, 1925). For studies that built upon these insights with a greater focus on women, gender, immigration, and work, see Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements (Temple University Press, 1986); Nan Enstad, Ladies of Labor, Girls of Adventure (Columbia University Press, 1999).
[17] For additional context on the business history of Coney Island, see Woody Register, The Kid of Coney Island (Oxford University Press, 2001).
[18] See, for example, Stuart Hall’s landmark essay from the same moment, “Notes on Deconstructing the Popular,” in Raphael Samuel, ed., People’s History and Socialist Theory (Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1981), 227-239. Too often, genealogies of the “cultural turn” have neglected these important crosscurrents running between the early U.S. cultural history scholarship produced by John Kasson, Ann Fabian, George Lipsitz, Jackson Lears, Michael Denning, Kathy Peiss, Richard Ohmann, Robin Kelley, et. al. with the pathbreaking cultural studies work coming out of the UK. Although it took a bit of time for these crosscurrents to be fully recognized and explicated, they were, in fact, a central motor for our subfield.
[19] John Kasson, Rudeness and Civility (Hill & Wang, 1990).
[20] Ibid.
[21] On this score, Rudeness and Civility operated in wonderfully symbiotic ways with Karen Halttunen’s adjacent tour de force, Confidence Men and Painted Women (Yale University Press, 1982). For me, these were the key books in nineteenth-century U.S. cultural history that threw off the priggish caricatures of “Victorian American” and made the broader context of the antebellum “market revolution” a rich new area for our field.
[22] Important previous studies of this milieu included Paul Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium (Hill & Wang, 1978); Mary Ryan, Cradle of the Middle Class (Cambridge University Press, 1981); Stuart Blumin, The Emergence of the Middle Class (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
[23] For useful statistics and descriptions of this process, see Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (W.W. Norton, 1994), 219; Carla Hesse, “The New Empiricism,” Cultural and Social History, Vol. 1, No. 2, (May 2004): 204; Sewell, Logics of History, 48.
[24] Joan Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry (Summer 1991): 781. See also, Scott’s earlier essay, “On Language, Gender, and Working-Class History,” International Labor and Working-Class History, 31 (Spring 1987): 1-13.
[25] This rich phrase, “internecine agonies,” comes from Geoff Eley, A Crooked Line (University of Michigan Press, 2005).
[26] In my own work, I’ve tried to capture a similar form of “knowingness” in the context of popular/mass culture. See, for example, my discussion of P.T. Barnum’s hoaxing in the Arts of Deception (in which the whole point of the exercise was to draw attention to his own methods as showman), as well as my 2008 essay, “The Return of the Culture Industries,” which pondered Adorno’s late-career fascination with commercial publics who “see through” portions of the culture industries’ rhetorics and formulas. Gabrielle Spiegel has articulated a related mode of cultural historical analysis, running her lines of argument through the sociological work of Pierre Bourdieu and Richard Bernacki: “In this view, culture emerges less as a systematic structure than as a repertoire of competencies, a ‘tool kit’… or a set of strategies guiding action, whereby signs/symbols are mobilized to identify those aspects of an agent’s experience, which, in this process are made meaningful, that is, experientially ‘real.” Culture is thereby recast as a ‘performative turn,’ one realized only processually as ‘signs put to work’ to ‘reference’ and interpret the world. Historical investigation, from this perspective, would take practices (not structure) as the starting point of social analysis, and practice itself assumes the form of a sociology of meaning.” “Comment on A Crooked Line,” American Historical Review 113, 2 (April 2008): 412.
[27] Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man: The White Male Body and the Challenge of Modernity in America (Hill & Wang, 2001).
[28] In Amusing the Million, for example, John’s readings of heterosocial leisure spaces for new immigrants at Coney Island zeroed in on shifting ideas about gender and sex within Progressive-era “youth culture.” Similarly, his readings of antebellum etiquette books and fashion guides in Rudeness and Civility suggested new models of masculinity and femininity within the rising middle-class cultures of white urbanites.
[29] This was in response to a paper by Dr. Sharon Ullman, who would soon publish her work on Elting as part of Sex Seen (University of California Press, 1998).
[30] Peter Filene, Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in Modern America (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975) and Striving Fathers/ Troubled Sons (Thursday Press, 2018); Joy Kasson, Marble Queens and Captives: Women in 19th-Century American Sculpture (Yale University Press, 1990) and Buffalo Bill’s Wild West (Hill & Wang, 2001).
[31] Sewell, “The Concept(s) of Culture.” For broader explication of these rubrics in U.S. historiography, see Cook and Glickman, “Twelve Propositions for a History of U.S. Cultural History.”
[32] Houdini, Tarzan, and the Perfect Man, pp. 13-19.
[33] Key conceptual works included Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Analysis (1986); Scott, Gender and the Politics of History; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States (Routledge, 1986); John D’Emilio, “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, & Sharon Thompson, eds., Powers of Desire (Monthly Review Press, 1983), 100-116); John D’Emillio & Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters (University of Chicago Press, 1988); Kimberly Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 32. 6 (1991): 1241-1299; Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, “African American Women’s History and the Metalanguage of Race, Signs, 17, 2 (1992): 251-274. Leading U.S. cultural histories of race, gender, class, and sexuality working in these deconstructive and intersectional modes included David Rodeiger, The Wages of Whiteness (Verso, 1991); George Chauncey, Gay New York (Basic Books, 1994); Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization (University of Chicago Press, 1995); Kathleen Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs (Omohundro Institute/University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color (Harvard University Press, 1999).
[34] Because John has typically resisted academic jargon, mostly restricted his footnotes to primary sources, and published all five of his books with leading trade presses, some critics have mischaracterized his approach as “untheoretical.” See, for example, Richard Wightman Fox’s lengthy 1991 review of Rudeness and Civility, in which he takes John to task for making his conceptual points “lightly”; “describing” more than he “explains”; and offering “weighty generalizations” about complex subjects “ungrounded” in “theory.” “What Matters is Manners,” Reviews in American History 19, No. 2 (June 1991): 218-223. In my view, this somewhat snarky appraisal missed a crucial feature of John’s corpus. At every stage, John’s books have actively engaged with the latest conceptual debates, even if he has chosen to engage his readers with more accessible language and crystalline lines of questioning. As John’s work demonstrates, one need not pound the reader with terms like “deconstruction” and “intersectional” to write incisive histories of complex issues (ideology, mass culture, semiotics, whiteness) fully conversant with the latest debates.
[35] As John noted in his acknowledgments for the Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression, this “project began as an essay in honor of Lawrence Levine, and his memory and example have propelled me along the way.” (246).
[36] Roy Rosenzweig, “The State of Cultural History: A Conference in Honor of Lawrence W. Levine,” Journal of American History (December 2006): 755.
[37] James Cook, Lawrence Glickman, and Michael O’Malley, eds., The Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past, Present, and Future (University of Chicago Press, 2008).
[38] Lynn Hunt, The New Cultural History (University of California Press, 1989); Lynn Hunt & Victoria Bonell, eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn (University of California Press, 1999).
[39] Peter Mandler, “The Problem with Cultural History,” Cultural and Social History 1, 1 (January 2004): 94-97. This critique was published as the opening editorial for the British journal, Cultural and Social History. For responses to Mandler’s essay by Carla Hesse, Colin Jones, and Carol Watts, see the next issue from April 2004.
[40] William Sewell, Logics of History (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 52. In another passage, Sewell detailed more of his methodological concerns: “the pasts that cultural historians feel comfortable making claims about… tend to be the pasts of discourse, and above all those forms of discourse readily available in textual form. This reticence about naming an ‘extratextual’ social puts many of the questions and problematics that were central to the new social history beyond the pale of the new cultural history: questions, for example, about the distribution of wealth, the dynamics of economic development, changing patterns of landholding or employment, demographic structures, or patterns of geographical concentration and dispersion” (51).
[41] Sven Beckert, “History of American Capitalism,” in Eric Foner & Lis McGirr, eds., American History Now (Temple University Press, 2011), 316-318.
[42] Cook, “The Kids Are All Right: On the Turning of Cultural History,” American Historical Review, June 2012.
[43] Important examples of these early debates included Lawrence Levine’s “The Folklore of Urban Industrial Society,” Jackson Lears’ “Making Fun of Popular Culture,” and Robin D.G. Kelley’s “Notes on Deconstructing the Folk,” American Historical Review, 97, 2 (September 1992): 1369-1408. See also Michael Denning, “The End of Mass Culture,” International Labor and Working-Class History 37 (Spring 1990): 4-18.
[44] The recent scholarship in these directions is too wide and multi-disciplinary to summarize in a single footnote. For major examples, see Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry, Volume 28, No. 1 (Autumn 2001): 1-21; Daniel Miller, ed., Materiality (Duke University Press, 2005); Robin Bernstein, “Dances With Things,” Social Text, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 2009): 67-94; Tony Bennett & Parrick Joyce, eds., Material Powers (Routledge, 2010); Diana Coole & Samantha Frost, eds., The New Materialisms (Duke University Press, 2010); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter (Johns Hopkins Press, 2010); Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Routledge, 2014); Jennifer Roberts, Transporting Visions (University of California Press, 2014); Bill Brown, Other Things (University of Chicago Press, 2016); Nikhil Anand, Akhil Gupta, & Hannah Appel, eds., The Promise of Infrastructure (Duke University Press, 2018); Dipesh Chakrabaty, The Climate of History in a Planetary Age (University of Chicago Press, 2022); Mary Bridges, “The Infrastructural Turn in Historical Scholarship,” Modern American History, vol. 6, no.1 (2023):103–120; Lisa Parks, Julia Velkova, & Sander De Ridder, eds., Media Back Ends (University of Illinois Press, 2023); Aaron Mars, The American Transportation Revolution (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2024).
[45] For recent work on the twenty-first century “attention economies,” see Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants (Vintage, 2016); John Lanchester,” You Are The Product,” London Review of Books 39, 16 (17 August 2017); Kyla Scanlon, In This Economy (Crown, 2024); Chris Hayes, The Sirens’ Call: How Attention Became the World’s Most Endangered Resource (Penguin, 2025); Ezra Kelin, “How the Attention Economy is Devouring Gen Z—and the Rest of Us,” New York Times, 8 July 2025.
[46] In all these respects, John’s final book from 2014 was part of an important groundswell of innovation in U.S. economic, labor, and business history—one which no longer treated the cultural turn as conceptual “other” or antipode. Rather, in this context, the historiographical “turning” played out not so much as a one-way departure from the cultural, but as a migration of cultural history’s tools, methods, archives, and modes of questioning into other, adjacent subfields (and vice versa). See, for example, Scott Sandage, Born Losers, (Harvard University Press, 2005); Stephen Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters (Harvard University Press, 2007); Jane Kamensky, The Exchange Artist, (Viking, 2008); Bethany Morton, To Serve God and Walmart (Harvard University Press, 2009); Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive (The New Press, 2010); Julia Ott, When Wall Street Met Main Street (Harvard University Press, 2011); Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune (Harvard University Press, 2014); Nathan Connolly, A World More Concrete, (University of Chicago Press, 2016); Michael Zakim, Accounting for Capitalism (University of Chicago Press, 2018).
[47] Here again, John chose not to adopt academic jargon such as “affect theory” in his development of these arguments. Still, for anyone who has read Lauren Berlant’s The Female Complaint (Duke University Press, 2008) or Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Routledge, 2014), it is very clear that John was thinking in similar terms about the material production and public performance of emotion through a variety of media, platforms, and infrastructures.
[48] The Little Girl Who Fought the Great Depression, 20-21.